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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction Below
The district court had jurisdiction pursuant to Section
7002(a) of RCRA and 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006). In dismissing the
Complaint, the district court found that it lacked subject matter
jurisdiction. This appeal seeks review of that decision.
Jurisdiction on Appeal
On June 2, 2010, the district court granted New Union‟s
motion for summary judgment, and entered a judgment that
“CARE‟s action is dismissed.” Therefore, the district court‟s order
is a final decision, and this Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1291 (2006).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR APPEAL
This appeal presents the following issues:
Whether RCRA § 7002(a)(2) provides jurisdiction for district
courts to order EPA to act on CARE‟s petition for revocation of
EPA approval of New Union‟s hazardous waste program, filed
pursuant to RCRA § 7004.
Whether 28 U.S.C. § 1331 provides jurisdiction for district
courts to order EPA to act on CARE‟s petition for revocation of
EPA‟s approval of New Union‟s hazardous waste program, filed
under 5 U.S.C. § 553(e).
Whether EPA‟s failure to act on CARE‟s petition that EPA
initiate proceedings to consider withdrawing approval of New
Union‟s hazardous waste program under RCRA § 3006(e)
constituted a constructive denial of that petition and a
constructive determination that New Union‟s program continued
to meet RCRA‟s criteria for program approval under RCRA §
3006(b), both subject to judicial review under RCRA §§ 7002(a)(2)
and 7006(b).
Assuming the answer to Issue I and Issues II and/or III is
positive, whether this Court should lift the stay in C.A. No. 182010 and proceed with judicial review of EPA‟s constructive
actions, or should remand the case to the lower court to order
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EPA to initiate and complete proceedings to consider withdrawal
of New Union‟s hazardous waste program.
Assuming this Court proceeds to the merits of CARE‟s
challenge, whether EPA must withdraw its approval of New
Union‟s program because its resources and performance fail to
meet RCRA‟s approval criteria.
Assuming this Court proceeds to the merits of CARE‟s
challenge, whether EPA must withdraw its approval of New
Union‟s program because the New Union 2000 Environmental
Regulatory Adjustment Act effectively withdraws railroad
hazardous waste facilities from regulation.
Assuming this court proceeds to the merits of CARE‟s
challenge, whether EPA must withdraw its approval of New
Union‟s program because the New Union 2000 Environmental
Regulatory Adjustment Act renders New Union‟s program not
equivalent to the federal RCRA program, inconsistent with the
federal program and other approved state programs, or in
violation of the Commerce Clause.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Procedural Background
Citizen Advocates for Regulation and the Environment
(CARE) filed a citizen‟s suit in the United States District Court
for the District of New Union on January 4, 2010 seeking an
injunction requiring the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) to either act on their pending petition or, alternatively, for
the court to review an alleged constructive denial of the petition
by EPA. Soon after the filing, New Union successfully obtained
status as an intervenor in accordance with Rule 24 in the case
before the district court and in the petition for review filed with
the Court of Appeals, which CARE filed simultaneously with the
action pending in the district court. The Court of Appeals stayed
proceedings on the petition filed before them pending a decision
in the district court.
On June 2, 2010, the district court rendered its decision on
cross-motions for summary judgment filed by CARE and New
Union. In granting New Union‟s petition for summary judgment,
the court opined that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the claim
under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) §§
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7002(a)(2) and 7006(b), and 28 USC § 1331. CARE and EPA both
filed appeals with the United States Court of Appeals for the
Twelfth Circuit, which will now review the claims.
Factual Background
In 1986, pursuant to its authority under RCRA, EPA
approved New Union‟s hazardous waste program to operate in
lieu of the federal program. Although CARE admits that New
Union‟s program was indeed in accordance with RCRA guidelines
at the time of approval, it contends that the state‟s
administration of its RCRA program has incrementally lapsed.
CARE contends that the resources allocated to the program
have decreased significantly, preventing the state from effectively
administering the program.
New Union‟s RCRA program
oversees permitting, inspections, and enforcement. CARE alleges
that New Union is not adequately addressing demands on the
state hazardous waste program. CARE further argues that a
number of statutes adopted by New Union are inconsistent with
its duties and obligations under the program; CARE‟s petition
alleges that these statutes have withdrawn from regulation a
number of facilities whose oversight is mandated by RCRA, and
have even eliminated certain forms of waste from regulation in
violation of the federal program, and the Commerce Clause of the
Constitution. In light of these alleged failures, on January 5,
2009, CARE petitioned EPA to withdraw its approval of New
Union‟s state RCRA program under Sections 7006(b) and
7002(a)(2). EPA has not yet acted on this petition.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The approval of New Union‟s hazardous waste program was
a rulemaking rather than an adjudication because it created a
generally applicable rule that had future effect. Since the
approval was a rulemaking, the district court has jurisdiction to
order EPA to act on CARE‟s petition pursuant to RCRA §
7002(a)(2). Additionally, the more general 28 U.S.C. § 1331 must
yield RCRA‟s more specific jurisdictional provision, and thus the
district court does not have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 to
order EPA to act on CARE‟s petition.
EPA‟s failure to act on CARE‟s petition to withdraw approval
of New Union‟s hazardous waste program did not constitute a
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constructive denial of the petition and constructive determination
that New Union‟s program continued to meet approval
requirements because it did not represent the culmination of
EPA‟s decisionmaking process. Because EPA has not taken an
action which qualifies as a final agency action, the suit is not yet
ripe for judicial review under either RCRA §§ 7002(a)(2) or
7006(b). Furthermore, CARE‟s petition is time barred since it
was filed after the expiration of the 90-day statute of limitations
contained in those sections.
Assuming that the district court has jurisdiction under RCRA
§ 7002(a)(2) and/or 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and assuming that EPA‟s
failure to respond to CARE‟s petition constituted a constructive
denial and constructive determination, and the Court of Appeals
has jurisdiction to review these two actions under RCRA §
7006(b), the Court should not lift the stay on C.A. No. 18-2010.
Rather, the Court should remand to the district court to order
EPA to begin withdrawal proceedings under RCRA §§ 3006(e)
and 7004 because this is in the interest of judicial economy and
best carries out Congressional intent. Assuming that the Court
proceeds to the merits of CARE‟s challenge, EPA is not required
to withdraw its approval of New Union‟s approved state program.
New Union‟s hazardous waste program continues to meet the
approval requirements detailed in 40 C.F.R. Part 271, including
permitting, inspection, and enforcement functions.
Amendments made to the Railroad Regulation Act (RRA) by
the Environmental Regulatory Adjustment Act (ERAA) have no
bearing on approval status since these changes do not render
New Union‟s program deficient under the requirements of state
hazardous waste programs; this is true even taking into account
the removal of explicit state criminal sanctions. Federal
enforcement mechanisms remain in place, and New Union‟s
program remains in accordance with the enforcement
requirements necessary for approval. In fact, the ERAA does not
affect the equivalency of New Union‟s state program with the
federal program and does not create inconsistencies with federal
and other approved state programs. In addition, the ERAA‟s
treatment of Pollutant X does not place New Union‟s hazardous
waste disposal program in violation of the Commerce Clause
since state actions that use the least discriminatory means
possible to address legitimate state concerns that outweigh any
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apprehension of interruption to the flow of commerce do not
violate the Commerce Clause.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The questions of law to be evaluated by this Court should be
reviewed de novo. Theriot, Inc. v. United States, 245 F.3d 388,
395 (5th Cir. 1998). Review of federal agency action is governed
by the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551 (2006), and
should only be overturned if it “relied on factors which Congress
has not intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an
important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its
decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is
so implausible that is could not be ascribed to a difference in view
or to the product of agency expertise.” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n
of the U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43
(1983).
ARGUMENT
I.

RCRA § 7002(A)(2) PROVIDES JURISDICTION
FOR DISTRICT COURTS TO ACT ON CARE’S
PETITION FOR THE REVOCATION OF EPA’S
APPROVAL OF NEW UNION’S HAZARDOUS
WASTE PROGRAM.

RCRA § 7002(a)(2) grants citizens the right to commence a
civil action in the appropriate district court against the
Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) for
an alleged failure to perform a mandatory duty. 42 U.S.C. §
6972(a)(2) (2006). The lower court erred when it found that it did
not have jurisdiction under RCRA § 7002(a)(2) and granted New
Union‟s motion for summary judgment on the issue. The district
court does have jurisdiction to order EPA to act on CARE‟s
petition because EPA‟s approval of New Union‟s hazardous waste
program was a rulemaking, and thus the district court has
jurisdiction to order EPA to act under RCRA §§ 7002(a)(2) and
7004.
A. EPA’s Approval of New Union’s Hazardous Waste
Program Constituted a Rulemaking rather than an
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Adjudication.
The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) defines a rule in §
551(4) as “[t]he whole or part of an agency statement of general or
particular applicability and future effect designed to implement,
interpret, or prescribe law or policy . . .” 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (2006).
Londoner v. City & County of Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908) and BiMetallic Investment Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 239 U.S.
441 (1915) make the distinction between what agency actions
constitute orders (the output of adjudicatory procedures), and
what actions constitute rules (the output of the rulemaking
procedure), respectively. Justice Holmes distinguished BiMetallic, in which Colorado increased the value of all taxable
property in Denver by forty percent, from Londoner, where a tax
was apportioned to individual property owners based on the
proportion of the benefits they received. 239 U.S. at 445-46.
Holmes illustrated the distinction between rulemaking and
adjudication when he stated that “[i]n Londoner v. Denver . . . a
relatively small number of persons was concerned, who were
exceptionally affected, in each case upon individual grounds . . .
but that decision is far from reaching a general determination
dealing only with the principle upon which all the assessments in
a county had been laid.” Id.
The Attorney General’s Manual on the Administrative
Procedure Act (1947) further clarifies the distinction between a
rule and an order. A rule may be of either general or particular
applicability for either a class or a single person. Id. at 13. A
defining characteristic of a rule is that it is “of future effect,
implementing or prescribing future law.” Id. In contrast, an order
defines “past and present rights and liabilities.” Id. The Supreme
Court of California has described “adjudicatory matters” as
instances that impact individuals and are “determined by facts
particular to the individual case,” whereas rulemakings “involve
the adoption of a „broad, generally applicable rule of conduct on
the basis of public policy.‟” Horn v. Cnty. of Ventura, 596 P.2d
1134, 1138 (Cal. 1979).
Courts have determined that when EPA makes changes to
state RCRA programs, these actions are rulemakings under the
APA. For example, in U.S. v. Southern Union Co., 643 F. Supp.
2d 201 (D.C.R.I. 2009), the petitioners challenged an action in
which EPA approved a change to Rhode Island‟s RCRA statute
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that granted conditional exemptions to small quantity generators,
a regulation more stringent than the federal program. Despite
the fact that the approved modification was specific to the Rhode
Island RCRA program, the court was nonetheless convinced that
EPA‟s approval constituted a rulemaking. Id. The court stated
that EPA‟s decision to use notice and comment procedures and to
allow for public participation indicated that “EPA intended to use
its legislative rulemaking authority in authorizing the changes to
Rhode Island‟s program.” Id. at 212 (citations omitted). The court
additionally noted that “the authorization imposed new standards
and other affirmative obligations on hazardous waste generators
in Rhode Island not already outlined in the law.” Id. at 212-13.
The principle distinctions between rulemaking and
adjudication described above make clear that the approval of a
state hazardous waste program is a rulemaking rather than an
adjudication. EPA has the authority to enact regulations via
rulemaking. 42 U.S.C. § 6912 (2006). In approving New Union‟s
state program, EPA‟s action created a general guideline with
wide-sweeping effect on all waste generators and any other party
interested in the handling of hazardous waste throughout the
state, not just one party. In addition, the state program had
future effect, rather than retroactive or present effect. By
following the notice and comment procedures required under APA
§ 553, including publication of notice in the Federal Register, the
state program could not have effect for at least 30 days following
publication. Finally, similarly to U.S. v. Southern Union Co., the
newly approved state hazardous waste plan imposed a set of new
standards and obligations on all affected parties within New
Union. Therefore, this action was clearly a rulemaking as opposed
to an adjudication.
B. EPA’s Categorization of its Action is Entitled to
Deference by the Court.
Although the lower court is correct in its assertion that the
EPA is not entitled to the level of deference discussed in Chevron
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837
(1984), in regard to its determination of whether or not their
action constitutes a rulemaking or an adjudication, the courts
have still afforded some degree of deference to the agency‟s
categorization if its own action. The court in British Caledonian
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Airways, Ltd. v. Civil Aeronautics Board, 584 F.2d 982 (D.C. Cir.
1978) examined the action of the Civil Aeronautics Board in
formulating the requirements on tariffs for carriers performing
charter flights. The plaintiff petitioned the court to review the
Board‟s action because it contended that the Board‟s declaratory
order actually constituted a rulemaking and, since it did not go
through APA § 553 notice and comment procedure, should be
deemed invalid. Id. at 983. The court stated that an agency has
discretion to decide whether to proceed by a rulemaking or
adjudication. Id. at 993.
In American Airlines, Inc. v. Department of Transportation,
202 F.3d 788 (5th Cir. 2000), the plaintiffs challenged an order
issued by the Department of Transportation (DOT) regarding air
passenger services. In determining that DOT‟s action constituted
an order, the court stated that “[i]n determining whether an
agency action constituted adjudication or rulemaking, we look to
the product of the agency action. We also accord significant
deference to an agency‟s characterization of its own action.” Id. at
797. Since an order is the outgrowth of an adjudicatory action,
and since the agency categorized its action as a declaratory order,
the court therefore found “that the agency engaged in
adjudication rather than rulemaking.” Id. at 797-98.
In the case at hand, the lower court erred by failing to give
any degree of deference to EPA‟s characterization of its decision
to approve New Union‟s RCRA program. EPA characterized its
action as a rulemaking and followed notice and comment
procedures under APA § 553. See CARE v. EPA, Civ. 000138-2010
(June 2, 2010). As such, EPA is entitled to deference concerning
this characterization, and the approval should be treated as a
rulemaking.
C. The District Court has Jurisdiction to Order EPA to
Act on CARE’s Petition under RCRA § 7002(a)(2).
Under RCRA § 7002(a)(2), a petitioner may commence an
action against the Administrator for an alleged failure to perform
a nondiscretionary duty in the proper district court. 42 U.S.C. §
6972(a)(2) (2006). Under RCRA § 7004, “any individual may
petition the administrator for the promulgation, amendment, or
repeal of any regulation . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 6974 (2006). Section
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7004 also requires that the Administrator “shall take action with
respect to such petition,” indicating that responding to CARE‟s
petition was a nondiscretionary duty. Id. (emphasis added).
Because EPA‟s approval of New Union‟s hazardous waste
program was a rulemaking, CARE properly petitioned EPA under
RCRA § 7004. Under § 7004, EPA is required to respond to such
petitions, and failed to do so. Therefore, CARE properly brought
suit under § 7002(a)(2) to compel the Administrator to perform
her nondiscretionary duty by responding to the petition, and the
district court has jurisdiction to hear that claim and to order EPA
to take such action.
II. THE GENERAL, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, MUST YIELD TO
THE SPECIFIC, RCRA.
Having established that the action in question is a rule, the
analysis must progress with this distinction in mind. When
reviewed in a vacuum, the EPA‟s rule-making action would lend
itself to an exercise of federal question jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1331 (2006). However, when considering the issues at
hand in the aggregate, the general 28 U.S.C. § 1331 must yield to
the specific, RCRA. See Bulova Watch Co. v. United States, 365
U.S. 753 (1961); Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504
(1981) (finding as a general rule that a specific statute controls
over a general one without regard to priority of enactment). As
such, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 does not provide jurisdiction for district
courts to order EPA to act on CARE‟s petition.
In Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Company, an injured
felon on work-release, Green, brought a product liability action
against the manufacturer of a commercial dryer which he claimed
caused him to lose his arm. 490 U.S. 504 (1981). During the
trial, the defense impeached Green‟s character by eliciting
admission that Green had been convicted of conspiracy to commit
burglary and burglary, both felonies. Id. at 506. On appeal,
Green argued that the district court erred in denying Green‟s
pretrial motion to exclude the impeaching evidence. Id. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the district court‟s ruling, holding that
Rule 609(a), which allowed impeachment of a witness by prior
felony convictions in a civil context, was not subject to a Rule 403
balancing test. Id. Thus, the judge had no duty to exclude the
evidence in light of its prejudicial value. Id. In the Supreme
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Court‟s majority opinion, Justice Stevens reasoned that Rule 609
contains it own weighing language and its specificity meant the
application of the more general Rule 403 balancing test would go
against what Congress clearly intended by including explicit
language to the contrary within Rule 609. Id. at 526.
The lower court here made note of this “old maxim of
statutory interpretation that the specific governs over the
general,” citing Green v. Bock, 490 U.S. 504. CARE v. EPA, Civ.
000138-2010 (June 2, 2010). EPA agrees with the trial court that
the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 553(e), is a general statutory authority for
rulemaking petitions, while RCRA § 7002 is the specific statutory
authority for such an action under RCRA. 42 U.S.C. § 6972
(2006). As such, 5 U.S.C. § 553(e) is replaced by the overlapping
and more specific provisions of RCRA. Such a finding is
analogous to the Court‟s holding in Green; had Congress intended
28 U.S.C. § 1331 to be the source of jurisdiction for rulemaking
petitions under RCRA it would have remained silent on the
matter and omitted the jurisdictional element of RCRA § 7002.
See 490 U.S. at 526. As such, the district court does not have
jurisdiction to order EPA to act on CARE‟s petition under 28
U.S.C. § 1331.
III. EPA’S FAILURE TO ACT ON CARE’S PETITION
DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A CONSTRUCTIVE
DENIAL AND CONSTRUCTIVE
DETERMINATION.
Although EPA has not yet responded to CARE‟s petition to
revoke approval of New Union‟s hazardous waste program, this
inaction in and of itself does not constitute a constructive denial
of the petition and a constructive determination that New Union‟s
program continues to meet approval criteria. Even if this
inaction were a constructive denial and determination, it is not a
final agency action and thus is not subject to judicial review
under either RCRA § 7002(a)(2) or § 7006.. Additionally, the suit
is time barred and thus is also precluded from judicial review by
this court under RCRA §§ 7002(a)(2) and 7006.
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A. EPA’s Failure to Act on CARE’s Petition does not
Constitute a Constructive Denial.
In Sierra Club v. Thomas, 828 F.2d 783 (D.C. Cir. 1987), the
Sierra Club petitioned EPA to add strip mines to its list of
fugitive emissions sources under the Clean Air Act (CAA). Id. at
785. Although the agency stated that it was gathering
information, it failed to take action on Sierra Club‟s request for
nearly two years. Id. Petitioners brought a citizen suit similar to
the claim at issue here, arguing that by not responding to the
petition, the Administrator had failed to perform a
nondiscretionary duty under the CAA. Id. at 787.
The court said that a duty of timeliness exists if the statute
“categorically mandate[es] that all specified action be taken by a
date-certain deadline.” Id. at 791. The court assessed a number of
factors in making the determination of whether the petitioner has
a right to timely decision making, including whether there are
Congressionally-imposed deadlines on the agency, if “the
statutory scheme implicitly contemplates timely final action,” if
there will be an effect on the petitioner‟s interests aside from
timely decisionmaking, and if there will be an adverse effect on
the agency in dealing with more pressing matters should the
court require expedition of the process. Id. at 797. The court then
stressed the deference due to the agency in developing a
timetable for action: “[w]hen we assess these factors, we must
remember that „[a]bsent a precise statutory timetable or other
factors counseling expeditious action, an agency‟s control over the
timetable of a rulemaking proceeding is entitled to considerable
deference.” Id. (quoting Sierra Club v. Gorsuch, 715 F.2d 653, 658
(D.C. Cir. 1983)).
In order for an agency‟s failure to act to constitute a
constructive denial, the agency inaction must have “precisely the
same impact on the rights of the parties as denial of relief.” Id. at
793. Further, the inaction should represent an “agency
recalcitrance . . . in the face of a clear statutory duty . . . of such
magnitude that it amounts to an abdication of statutory
responsibility.” Id. It is clear that EPA‟s inaction in the case at
hand did not constitute a constructive denial and constructive
determination. EPA was not under a specific deadline for
responding to CARE‟s petition. Although some time has passed
since the petition was submitted, EPA has many pressing
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concerns to address and must prioritize among them, and EPA is
entitled to some deference in these decisions. This inaction does
not represent “agency recalcitrance,” but rather is simply a delay
in beginning investigations needed to properly respond to the
petition.
The case before the Court is easily distinguishable from Scott
v. City of Hammond, 741 F.2d 992 (7th Cir. 1984), in which the
court found that there was a “constructive submission.” In that
case, EPA required states to promulgate total maximum daily
loads (TMDLs) for certain identified pollutants for the waters
within their borders within 180 days. Id. at 996-97. When the
states did not make their submissions to EPA within the allotted
time period, the court found that the delay may have constituted
a “constructive submission” that TMDLs for Lake Michigan were
unnecessary. Id. at 997. The court further added that “the states‟
inaction in view of the short statutory deadlines, may have
ripened into a refusal to act.” Id. at 997-98 (emphasis added). In
comparison, there is no statutorily imposed deadline on EPA to
act on petitions for withdrawal under RCRA § 3006(e). 42 U.S.C.
§ 6296(e) (2006). Without such deadlines, it is within the agency‟s
discretion to determine when action is appropriate. Thus, EPA
inaction in this case does not constitute a constructive denial of
the permit and constructive determination that New Union‟s
hazardous waste program continues to meet approval criteria.
B. CARE’s Suit is not Ripe for Judicial Review because
a Constructive Determination is not a Final Agency
Action.
Even if the Court finds there was a constructive denial, this
Court does not have jurisdiction to hear this case under RCRA §
7006 because a constructive denial is not a final agency action.
See Sierra Club v. EPA, 922 F.2d 337, 347. The APA provides
that “[a]gency action made reviewable by statute and final agency
action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court are
subject to judicial review.” 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2006). The Supreme
Court has articulated a two part analysis for determining if an
action constitutes a “final agency action” for purposes of judicial
review. An action is “final” if (1) it represents “the „consummation‟
of the agency‟s decisionmaking process” and is not “merely
tentative or interlocutory [in] nature;” and (2) it is an action “by
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which „rights and obligations have been determined,‟ or from
which „legal consequences will flow.‟” Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S.
154, 177-78 (1997) (citations omitted). See also Abbott Labs. v.
Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149 (1976). Additionally, EPA has not
taken final action if they have merely deferred taking action. Am.
Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 216 F.3d 50, 68 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
In this case, EPA‟s alleged constructive denial of CARE‟s
petition is not a final agency action and thus is not reviewable by
this Court. The fact that EPA has not yet made a decision
concerning CARE‟s petition does not represent the
“consummation of the agency‟s decisionmaking process.” Bennett,
520 U.S. at 178. EPA was not required to act on the petition
within a specific time frame. 42 U.S.C. § 6974(a) (2006). Indeed,
EPA could take action on the petition today and render the
court‟s consideration of this issue moot. Nothing has been
published in the Federal Register concerning the petition. See 42
U.S.C. § 6974(a) (2006); Am. Portland Cement Alliance v. EPA,
101 F.3d 772, 776 (D.C. Cir. 1996). These factors indicate that
the Agency‟s decisionmaking process has not yet been fully
carried out, and weigh against it being considered a final agency
action. Because it is not a final agency action, this Court does not
have jurisdiction to review it under RCRA §§ 7002(a)(2) or 7006.
C. CARE’s Suit is Time Barred.
Even if the Court finds that there was a constructive denial
and determination, and these actions constituted final agency
action and are ripe for review, the suit is time barred and as such
judicial review is not available under RCRA §§ 7002(a)(2) and
7006. Section 7006(b) provides that judicial review under that
section can only be had if the action is “made within ninety days
from the date of such issuance, denial, modification, revocation,
grant, or withdrawal, or after such date only if such application is
based solely on grounds which arose after such ninetieth day.” 42
U.S.C. § 6976(b) (2006). The facts which CARE claims caused
New Union‟s hazardous waste program to be inadequate arose
years ago, and are clearly outside of the ninety day statute of
limitations. Even if CARE argues that the relevant date is the
date on which EPA constructively denied their petition, there is
no basis for determining when such denial occurred since Section
7004(a) does not require the Administrator to act on a petition
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within a specified time period. 42 U.S.C. § 6974(a) (2006).
Therefore, the action before this Court is time barred.
IV. THE COURT SHOULD REMAND TO THE
DISTRICT COURT TO ORDER EPA TO BEGIN
WITHDRAWAL PROCEEDINGS
Assuming that the district court has jurisdiction under RCRA
§ 7002(a)(2) and/or 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and assuming that EPA‟s
failure to respond to CARE‟s petition constituted a constructive
denial of the petition and a constructive determination that New
Union‟s program continues to meet RCRA‟s approval criteria and
the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review these two actions
under RCRA § 7006(b), the Court should not lift the stay on C.A.
No. 18-2010. Rather, the Court should remand to the district
court to order EPA to begin proceedings to consider withdrawal of
New Unions RCRA program under RCRA §§ 3006(e) and 7004.
A. It is in the Interest of Judicial Economy and Best
Carries out Congressional Intent to Remand the
Case.
Under this set of assumptions, both the district court and the
Court of Appeals could have jurisdiction to move forward with
this case. The district court has jurisdiction under RCRA §
7002(a)(2) to hear CARE‟s citizen suit in which they are seeking
an injunction requiring the Administrator to perform a
nondiscretionary duty by acting on CARE‟s petition. On the other
hand, assuming that there was a constructive denial and
constructive determination, the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction
to review EPA‟s actions under § 7006(b). In this case, the Court
should not lift the stay on C.A. No 18-2010, because it makes
more sense given the statutory scheme and because it is in the
interest of judicial economy to instead remand to the district
court and require the district court to order EPA to begin
withdrawal proceedings.
Some courts have said that, under laws such as the Clean Air
Act, if jurisdiction exists in both the Court of Appeals and the
district court, then the Court of Appeals jurisdiction cancels out
district court jurisdiction. See Oljato Chapter of the Navajo Tribe
v. Train, 515 F.2d 654, 661 (D.C. Cir. 1975). However, the
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situation here is factually quite different, and the structure of
RCRA suggests that in this case, the district court is best situated
to move this case forward.
The Oljato case involved national performance standards for
coal fired power plants under the Clean Air Act. The court found
that that the Court of Appeals was the proper court to exercise
jurisdiction because Congressional intent favored consistent
application of national standards across the country and avoided
bifurcated litigation. Id. at 660-61. In the case at hand, however,
lifting the stay and reviewing the constructive denial and
determination in the Court of Appeals would go against
Congressional intent. Congress assigned EPA the task of
implementing RCRA and regulating hazardous wastes. 42 U.S.C.
§ 6912 (2006). EPA has the expertise to oversee RCRA, while the
Court does not. Congress expressed its intention that EPA and
the states have broad discretion and flexibility in implementing
federal and state hazardous waste programs in order to achieve
the desired results. See 45 Fed. Reg. 33,290, 33,385 (May 19,
1980). This intent is best carried out by remanding to the district
court, which will then order EPA to begin withdrawal
proceedings. EPA can then apply its process and expertise in
assessing whether withdrawal is necessary or what changes New
Union may need to make in order to correct any deficiencies in its
program. The Court of Appeals could then review EPA‟s actions
afterward if need be. This is more efficient than choosing to have
this Court review the constructive denial and determination
without the benefit of EPA‟s record. As such, the Court should
not lift the stay on C.A. No. 18-2010, and should instead remand
to the district court to order the EPA to begin withdrawal
proceedings.
V.

EPA IS NOT REQUIRED TO WITHDRAW ITS
APPROVAL OF NEW UNION’S STATE PROGRAM.

Assuming that the Court proceeds to the merits of CARE‟s
challenge, EPA is not required to withdraw its approval of New
Union‟s approved state program. While there may be some
deficiencies in the available funding that have prevented New
Union from carrying out its approved state program as fully as
would be ideal, its resources and funding are still sufficient for
EPA to continue to approve of New Union‟s state RCRA program.
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In the alternative, even if New Union‟s resources and
performance are insufficient to support EPA‟s continued approval
of the state program, EPA is not required to withdraw its
approval of the program. Rather, EPA has discretion to initiate
proceedings to withdraw the approval of any approved state
RCRA program, and may take corrective actions other than
simply withdrawing New Union‟s state program approval. 42
U.S.C. § 6926 (2006).
A. New Union’s Program is Sufficient for EPA’s
Continued Approval
RCRA § 3006 provides that states may develop and enforce
their own hazardous waste programs to operate in lieu of the
federal program. Id. State programs must be approved by the
EPA Administrator before they can take effect. Id. Approved
state programs must be at least as stringent as the federal RCRA
requirements, and are permitted but not required to be more
stringent than the federal program. Id. In addition, an approved
state program must comply at all times with the requirements
detailed in 40 C.F.R. Part 271, which describes the procedures
and criteria for the approval, revision, and withdrawal of state
hazardous waste programs. 40 C.F.R. § 271.1 (a), (c), and (g).
Because the resources devoted to New Union‟s approved
hazardous waste program and New Union DEP‟s performance in
carrying out the program are sufficient to satisfy the standards
for continued approval under 40 C.F.R. Part 271, EPA is not
required to withdraw approval of the state program.
i.

Permitting

The regulations applicable to state approved programs do not
require the New Union DEP to respond to permit applications
within a specified amount of time. Under 40 C.F.R. § 271.14
(2010), certain provisions of Parts 124 and 270 are incorporated
and applied to state permitting programs, and state permitting
must comply with those specific provisions at all times. None of
these sections state a time period within which the state must
respond to an application. While RCRA § 3005 does include time
periods in which the EPA or state must respond to a permit
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application, those dates only apply to permit applications
submitted before November 8, 1984. 42 U.S.C. § 6925(c) (2006).
In fact, the regulations anticipate that the permitting
authorities may not address permit applications immediately. In
states with approved RCRA programs, the operation of a permit
will continue indefinitely even after it has expired as long as the
permittee has submitted a complete and timely application to
renew the permit. 40 C.F.R. § 270.51(d) (2010). The existing
permit will remain in effect until the state issues or denies the
new permit. Id. Thus, while a backlog of permit applications is
not ideal, Congress recognizes that efficiency and the interests of
public health are best served under the current system. This
pragmatic approach puts no temporal cap on how much time
states have to respond.
ii.

Inspections

RCRA § 3007(e) describes the inspection requirements for
state programs. A state with an approved program “shall
commence a program to thoroughly inspect every facility for the
treatment, storage or disposal of hazardous waste for which a
permit is required . . . no less often than every two years . . .” 42
U.S.C. § 6927(e)(1) (2006) (emphasis added). While the use of the
word “shall” often indicates a mandatory duty on behalf of the
state, the Supreme Court has noted that “shall” is sometimes
incorrectly used when it is really intended to mean “will,”
“should,” or “may.” Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno, 515 U.S.
417, 432-33 n.9 (1995). When this provision is read in context
and in relation to other inspection regulations, it becomes clear
that this is a case in which “shall” really indicates that
inspections “should” be conducted on a biennial basis, but are not
necessarily required to be conducted within that time period.
Section 3007(e) of the Act goes on to say that the
Administrator is required to promulgate regulations governing
“the minimum frequency and manner of such inspections,” and in
doing so may “distinguish between classes and categories of
facilities commensurate with the risks posed by each class or
category.” 42 U.S.C. § 6927(e)(1) (2006). This indicates that the
regulations may require different time periods in which
inspections must occur, and that it is proper to prioritize facilities
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by risk, much as New Union has done in deciding which facilities
to inspect most frequently. The corresponding regulations do not
include a requirement concerning how often TSD facility
inspections must be completed. They only require “periodic
inspections” that are capable of determining compliance, verifying
the accuracy of information submitted by the permittee, and
verifying that monitoring at the facility is adequate. 40 C.F.R. §
271.15(b)(2) (2010). These other provisions indicate that while it
would be ideal to inspect facilities biennially, this is an
aspirational goal rather than a strict requirement, and as such
New Union‟s inspection program is adequate for purposes of
continued approval of the state RCRA program.
iii.

Enforcement

A State administered RCRA program is required to provide a
State agency with a certain level of enforcement authority. The
agency must have the ability “to restrain immediately and
effectively any person by order or by suit in state court from
engaging in any unauthorized activity which is endangering or
causing damage to public health or the environment.” 40 C.F.R. §
271.16(a)(1) (2010). It must also have the authority “to sue in
courts of competent jurisdiction to enjoin any threatened or
continuing violation of any program requirement, including
permit conditions, without the necessity of a prior revocation of
the permit;” and the ability “to access or sue to recover in civil
court penalties and to seek criminal remedies, including fines . . .”
40 C.F.R. § 271.16(a)(1), (2) (2010).
New Union‟s enforcement program includes all of these
required components, and makes use of them in taking corrective
actions against those violating state RCRA permits. While there
are violations that have gone unpunished, there is nothing in the
statute or regulations that require the state to take action on
each and every violation. In addition, it is anticipated in the
statute and regulations that states will have assistance from EPA
and from citizens, as has occurred in New Union. EPA retains
some enforcement authority in states with approved programs
under RCRA § 3008 and 40 C.F.R. § 271.19, and citizens can
bring suit against anyone who is violating the terms of a RCRA
permit under RCRA § 7002 and 40 C.F.R. § 271.16(d). Therefore,
New Union‟s enforcement program meets all requirements for
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continued approval of its state RCRA program and the
Administrator is not required to withdraw approval.
B. EPA has Discretion to Take Action Other than
Withdrawing Approval.
Even if the resources that New Union has devoted to its
RCRA program and New Union‟s implementation of the program
are deemed inadequate, the Administrator still is not required to
withdraw approval of New Union‟s approved RCRA program.
The statute gives the Administrator discretion to determine
whether withdrawal of approval is appropriate in a given
circumstance. 42 U.S.C. § 6926 (2006). Additionally, EPA has the
option to take corrective action to fix deficiencies in the state
program instead of simply withdrawing approval. Id.
The language used in both the statute and the regulations
indicate that, while the Administrator has the authority to
withdraw approval, she has discretion in choosing whether it is
appropriate to do so. Section 3006(e) gives the Administrator the
authority to withdraw authorization of state programs. 42 U.S.C.
§ 6926(e) (2006). Although under this section the Administrator
must notify the state of deficiencies in the state program and
must withdraw authorization if those problems are not corrected,
the initial determination in which the Administrator finds that
the state program is inadequate is not a mandatory duty. Id.
This is an instance in which the Administrator may exercise
discretion to determine that a state program is inadequate, and
the related mandatory duties are only triggered after the initial
determination has been made. See, e.g., Natural Res. Def. Council
v. Train, 545 F.2d 320 (2d Cir. 1976).
The regulations list a number of circumstances which may
lead the Administrator to withdraw program approval, including
a failure to issue permits, to take action concerning permit
violations, to take enforcement action, and to properly inspect
and monitor regulated activities. 40 C.F.R. § 271.22(a). The
regulations state that “[t]he Administrator may withdraw
program approval when a State program no longer complies with
the requirements of this subpart, and the State fails to take
corrective action.” Id. (emphasis added). This reinforces the
conclusion that the Administrator has discretion as to whether to
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begin proceedings to withdraw approval of a state program.
Additionally, it highlights the fact that the Administrator must
take other steps before simply withdrawing approval of the state
RCRA program. The Administrator needs to hold a public
hearing, provide notice of deficiency to the state, and give the
state ninety days to correct the program before the Administrator
proceeds with the program withdrawal process. Id., 42 U.S.C. §
6926(e) (2006).
CARE brought this suit pursuant to RCRA‟s citizen suit
provision in § 7002(a)(2). This section provides that “any person”
may bring suit to compel the Administrator to perform a nondiscretionary duty. 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(2) (2006). Because the
EPA Administrator has discretion to make a determination
concerning the adequacy of an approved state RCRA program, the
Court lacks jurisdiction to compel the Administrator to withdraw
approval of the state program. Therefore, EPA is not required to
withdraw approval of New Union‟s approved state RCRA
program.
VI. EPA IS NOT REQUIRED TO WITHDRAW ITS
APPROVAL OF NEW UNION’S STATE PROGRAM
BECAUSE OF CHANGES MADE TO THE RRA
While CARE argues that ERAA effectively withdraws
railroad hazardous waste from regulation, such an assertion is
facially incorrect. Rather, New Union has shifted regulation to a
newly created New Union Railroad Commission. (R. at 3). This
transfer is a shifting of authority—not a complete dissolution of
regulation by New Union. In creating and implementing a
Commission uniquely focused and attuned to the regulation of
interstate railroad freight rates, railroad tracks and rights of
way, and railroad ways, New Union has appropriately exercised
the very power bestowed upon it by Congress in RCRA § 3006
(providing that states may develop and enforce their own
hazardous waste programs to operate in lieu of the federal
program). 42 U.S.C. § 6926 (2006). This arrangement does not
render New Union‟s program deficient under the requirements of
state hazardous waste programs. 40 C.F.R. Part 271 (2010).
Even in light of the removal of explicit state criminal sanctions,
federal enforcement mechanisms remain in place and
unhindered, rendering New Union‟s program in accordance with
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the enforcement requirements necessary for approval. See United
States v. Flanagan, 126 F. Supp. 2d 1284, 1287 (D.C. Cal. 2000);
United States v. MacDonald & Watson Waste Oil Co., 933 F.2d
35, 44 (1st Cir. 1991) (finding that federal criminal provisions of
RCRA, notably 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d), are meant to apply within
states having authorized programs and that this federal criminal
jurisdiction subsumes both states and federal permits).
Even after EPA has granted authorization to a state
program, there remains a strong federal presence. MacDonald,
933 F.2d at 44. In MacDonald, the First Circuit affirmed that the
federal government‟s ability to obtain criminal penalties against
generators and other persons who knowingly transport hazardous
waste absent proper permitting, even after granting approval to
Rhode Island‟s state hazardous waste program. Id. at 45.
Appellants, hired to remove and clean up contaminated soil, had
authorization to dispose of liquid, but not solid, waste. Id. at 39.
Lacking the proper permit, appellants were cited with violating
criminal provisions within 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d). Id. at 43. They
argued that Rhode Island‟s authorized state program displaced
the federal program, leaving no federal crime and ousting the
federal court of jurisdiction. Id. The court found no merit in this
contention, holding that § 6928(d) and companion federal
criminal provisions “are meant to apply within states having
authorized programs” and that had Congress intended otherwise
“its intentions surely would have been manifested.” Id. at 44.
ERAA amended the RRA by transferring “all standard
setting, permitting, inspection, and enforcement authorities of
the DEP under any and all state environmental statutes to the
Commission.” (R. at 3). The Commission, by design, is a state
agency and the Commissioners are state employees, with
appointees chosen by the Governor, State Senate, and State
House of Representatives. Id. CARE may wish to argue that
ERAA‟s removal of criminal sanctions for violations of
environmental statutes by facilities falling under the jurisdiction
of the Commission leaves New Union in violation of the
enforcement provision requirement. 40 C.F.R. § 271.16(a)(ii)
(2010).
Relevant jurisprudence renders such an assertion
patently false.
The intent of Congress is to have an ever-present
enforcement of federal criminal sanctions, and New Union has

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol1/iss1/4

22

04

4/24/2011 2:28 AM

Sive_Award

2011]

DAVID SIVE AWARD WINNER

115

done nothing to hinder such an effort. MacDonald, 933 F.2d at
44. In MacDonald, the silence of the Rhode Island program did
not obstruct EPA from unilaterally enforcing RCRA‟s criminal
provisions, and New Union‟s absence of criminal sanctions should
be handled in the same manner. Id. at 43. As such, the federal
criminal enforcement mechanisms of RCRA, 40 C.F.R. § 271.16,
remain in place within New Union.
For the reasons above (See Part V.B.), even if it is found that
New Union fails to meet the requirements under RCRA, EPA has
discretion to initiate proceedings to withdraw the approval of any
approved state RCRA program, and may take corrective actions
other than simply withdrawing New Union‟s State program
approval. 42 U.S.C. § 6926 (2006).
VII. EPA IS NOT REQUIRED TO WITHDRAW
APPROVAL OF NEW UNION’S STATE PROGRAM
DUE TO PASSAGE OF THE ERAA
Assuming that the Court proceeds to the merits of CARE‟s
challenge, the content of New Union‟s 2000 Environmental
Regulatory Adjustment Act (ERAA) does not lead to the
conclusion that EPA must withdraw approval of New Union‟s
approved state RCRA program. The relevant provisions of ERAA
amended the New Union hazardous waste program relating to
the regulation of Pollutant X. (R. at 3). ERAA requires that
facilities generating Pollutant X submit and carry out plans to
reduce generation of the pollutant each year until Pollution X
generation ceases entirely. Id. The Act prohibits DEP from
issuing permits allowing treatment, storage or disposal of
Pollutant X, except for temporary storage while awaiting
transport to a treatment or disposal facility located outside the
state. Id. Additionally, Pollutant X can only be transported
through or out of the state if transport is done as quickly and
directly as possible. Id.
RCRA § 3006(b) requires that a state program must not be
approved if it is “not equivalent to the Federal program” or “not
consistent with the Federal or State programs applicable in other
states. . .” 42 U.S.C. § 6926(b) (2010). The Administrator has the
power to withdraw approval of an approved state program if it no
longer meets these requirements. 42 U.S.C. § 6926(e) (2006).
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State programs also must not regulate hazardous waste, a
recognized type of interstate commerce, in a manner that violates
the Commerce Clause. In this case, EPA is not required to
withdraw approval of New Union‟s program because ERAA does
not affect the program‟s equivalency to the federal RCRA
program, does not render it inconsistent with federal or other
approved state programs, and does not violate the Commerce
Clause.
A. ERAA does not Affect the State Program’s
Equivalency with the Federal Program.
Despite the changes made by ERAA, New Union‟s state
RCRA program is still equivalent to the federal program. A state
program does not have to be exactly the same as the federal
program in order to be considered equivalent; because New
Union‟s program is still at least as stringent as the federal
program, it is considered equivalent to the federal RCRA
program.
According to § 3006, a state program must be
“equivalent” to the federal RCRA program in order to become and
to continue as an approved state program. 42 U.S.C. § 6926(b), (e)
(2006). Equivalency is not defined in the statute, but is
determined by EPA on a case-by-case basis. U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency, Determining Equivalency of State RCRA
Hazardous Waste Programs, 1-2 (Sept. 7, 2005).
RCRA includes a “savings clause,” which provides that “no
State . . . may impose any requirements less stringent than those
authorized under this subchapter respecting the same matter
governed by such regulations . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 6929 (2006).
Additionally, it says that “[n]othing in this chapter shall be
construed to prohibit any State . . . from imposing any
requirements . . . which are more stringent than those imposed by
such regulations.” Id. (emphasis added). This indicates that the
federal regulations create a floor, rather than a ceiling, for
regulation of hazardous wastes. The inclusion of this provision
shows that Congress believed that “hazardous waste is not an
area of particular federal importance requiring one uniform
national system or plan of regulation. In fact, although Congress
recognized the need for federal regulation, it stated that „the
collection and disposal of solid wastes should continue to be
primarily a function of the State.‟” Old Bridge Chems., Inc. v.
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N.J. Dept. of Environmental Prot., 965 F.2d 1287, 1292 (3d Cir.
1992) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 6901(a)(4) (2006)).
EPA has determined that in assessing equivalency of a state
program, the focus should be on whether the state program
“provide[s] equal environmental results as the federal
counterparts,” and not on whether the state regulations directly
track federal requirements. EPA, Determining Equivalency, at 2.
As such, the focus is on ensuring that state programs “meet the
minimum national standards, rather than [focusing on] line-byline comparisons of State and Federal regulations.” 61 Fed. Reg.
18,822 (Apr. 29, 1996). This gives states flexibility to implement
their own regulatory programs, consistent with RCRA‟s purposes
and goal of hazardous waste regulation remaining primarily as a
state function.
New Union‟s program, as amended by ERAA, remains
equivalent to the federal program.
ERAA‟s regulation of
Pollutant X makes the state program more stringent than the
federal program, not less so. These more stringent requirements
are permissible under RCRA‟s savings clause. 42 U.S.C. § 6929
(2006). The amended program continues to meet and exceed the
applicable “minimum national standards.” 61 Fed. Reg. 18,822
(Apr. 29, 1996). ERAA also promotes RCRA‟s overall goals,
including protection of human health and the environment, and
reducing or eliminating hazardous waste generation. 42 U.S.C. §
6902 (2006). Therefore, New Union‟s state program remains
equivalent to the federal RCRA program, and EPA is not required
to withdraw its approval of the state program for this reason.
B. ERAA does not Create Inconsistencies Between the
New Union State Program and Federal or other
Approved State Programs.
EPA is also not required to withdraw approval of New
Union‟s hazardous waste program because ERAA does not cause
the program to be inconsistent with the federal or other approved
state programs. Under RCRA § 3006(b) and (e), an approved
state hazardous waste program must be “consistent with the
Federal or State programs applicable in other States;” if the
Administrator finds that a program is inconsistent, she must
begin proceedings to withdraw its approval. 42 U.S.C. § 6926(a),
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(e) (2006). This language is vague and gives the agency broad
discretion to implement this provision and corresponding
regulations. Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v. Reilly, 938
F.2d 1390, 1396 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
The regulations relating to consistency reiterate that state
hazardous waste programs must be consistent with federal and
other state programs, and also include further requirements. 40
C.F.R. § 271.4 (2010). First, a state program or aspect of a state
program will be deemed inconsistent if it “unreasonably restricts,
impedes, or operates as a ban on the free movement across the
State border of hazardous wastes from or to other States for
treatment, storage, or disposal at facilities authorized to operate
under the Federal or an approved State program.” 40 C.F.R. §
271.4(a) (2010). Second, a state law or state program may be
considered inconsistent if it “has no basis in human health or
environmental protection and . . . acts as a prohibition on the
treatment, storage or disposal of hazardous waste in the State.”
40 C.F.R. § 271.4(b) (2010).
The North Carolina state hazardous waste program‟s
consistency was at issue in Hazardous Waste Treatment Council
v. Reilly, 938 F.2d at 1390. North Carolina passed a law
requiring hazardous waste discharged into surface water to be
diluted one thousand fold by the receiving river; this requirement
rendered operations at a new state-of-the-art waste treatment
facility economically infeasible. Id. at 1394. The petitioners
argued that by passing this law, North Carolina was failing to
treat its share of the nation‟s hazardous waste. Id. at 1393. An
administrative law judge and the Regional Administrator found
that withdrawal was not warranted, and the issue in the case
became whether EPA had properly interpreted 40 C.F.R. §
271.4(b) relating to consistency. Id. at 1394-95.
Under EPA‟s interpretation, two requirements must both be
met before withdrawal is warranted under 40 C.F.R. § 271.4(b):
(1) the aspect of the program must have “no basis in human
health or environmental protection” and (2) must “act as a
prohibition on the treatment, storage or disposal of hazardous
waste in the State.” 40 C.F.R. § 271.4(b) (2010); Hazardous Waste,
938 F.2d at 1395. EPA‟s interpretation is that a state law only
“prohibits” hazardous waste treatment when it “effects a total
ban on a particular waste treatment technology within a state.”
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Hazardous Waste, 938 F.2d at 1395. The court deferred to the
agency‟s interpretation of its own regulations because the
interpretation was not “plainly wrong.” Id. (citing Chem. Mfrs.
Ass’n v. EPA, 919 F.2d 158, 170 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Chevron, 467
U.S. at 844-45). This interpretation was also consistent with the
goal of encouraging states to develop their own programs by
providing them with a level of flexibility in implementing their
programs. Hazardous Waste, 938 F.2d at 1396; 45 Fed. Reg.
33,290, 33,385 (May 19, 1980). The court concluded that North
Carolina‟s regulation did not constitute a statewide ban on a
particular waste treatment technology, and as such it did not
prohibit the treatment of hazardous waste under 40 C.F.R. §
271.4(b). Hazardous Waste, 938 F.2d at 1397. The court did not
address whether the regulation had a basis in human health or
environmental protection because it was unnecessary given the
fact that it was not a prohibition, and both factors must be
fulfilled in order for the state law to violate 40 C.F.R. § 271.4(b).
Id.
This Court should undertake a similar analysis for ERAA‟s
regulation of Pollutant X. Under EPA‟s interpretation of 40
C.F.R. § 271.4(b), ERAA does not create a statewide ban on the
treatment, storage, or disposal of Pollutant X. ERAA still allows
for short-term storage of Pollutant X. New Union will no longer
issue permits for treatment or disposal of Pollutant X, but there
are no existing facilities that are able to carry out either of these
functions in the state. The regulation also provides for gradually
eliminating any production of Pollutant X in New Union, so the
need for such treatment and disposal facilities will not exist in
the near future. As such, interpreting the ERAA as a complete
statewide ban on the treatment, storage or disposal of Pollutant X
is flawed.
Even if the Court does find that ERAA affects a total ban on
treatment, storage, and disposal of Pollutant X in New Union,
ERAA is based on legitimate concerns, including protecting
human health and the environment.
As such, it is not
inconsistent with 40 C.F.R. § 271.4(b). Both the World Health
Organization and EPA have found that Pollutant X is “among the
most potent and toxic chemicals to public health and the
environment.” (R. at 3). Additionally, there are no treatment or
disposal facilities in New Union that can adequately handle
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Pollutant X and prevent the public or the environment from
exposure to the pollutant; in fact, there are only nine such
facilities in the entire country. Id. The record shows that New
Union has legitimate concern for the effect this pollutant will
have on the public and on the environment. Because ERAA is
based on human health and environmental protection, New
Union‟s program is not inconsistent under 40 C.F.R. § 271.4(b),
since to be deemed inconsistent a program must both have no
basis in protecting human health or the environment, and must
act as a prohibition on treatment, storage, or disposal within the
state.
Additionally, New Union‟s hazardous waste program is not
inconsistent under 40 C.F.R. § 271.4(a) (2010) because it does not
“unreasonably [restrict, impede, or operate] as a ban on the free
movement across the State border of hazardous wastes from or to
other States for treatment, storage, or disposal.” (emphasis
added). ERAA does restrict the movement of Pollutant X within
New Union; however, these restrictions are not unreasonable.
People are free to transport Pollutant X through the state or out
of the state, as long as they in a manner that is quick, direct, and
which avoids unnecessary delay within the state. DEP will still
issue permits to allow for temporary storage of the pollutant
while it awaits transport out of the state. These restrictions are
reasonable and are intended to limit any potential exposure to
the pollutant. They clearly do not ban free movement through or
within the state. As such, ERAA is also consistent with the
federal and other state programs under 40 C.F.R. § 271.4(a).
New Union‟s hazardous waste program also continues to be
consistent with other approved state programs. Pollutant X is a
hazardous waste listed under RCRA § 3001. 42 U.S.C. § 6921
(2006). Under 40 C.F.R. § 271.9, states must list and control all
hazardous wastes listed by the federal program. New Union is
clearly controlling Pollutant X, and under RCRA‟s savings clause,
the state is free to impose restrictions that are more stringent. 42
U.S.C. § 6929 (2006). Because New Union has listed Pollutant X
and has imposed at least the minimum requirements, its
regulation of the pollutant is consistent with other state program,
which must also meet these minimum standards. Therefore, EPA
is not required to withdraw approval of New Union‟s hazardous
waste program because ERAA does not render the program
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inconsistent under 42 U.S.C. § 6926(b) and (e) and 40 C.F.R. §
271.4.
C. ERAA’s Treatment of Pollutant X does not Place
New Union’s Hazardous Waste Disposal Program in
Violation of the Commerce Clause.
ERAA is State legislation designed to regulate hazardous
waste, a recognized type of interstate commerce. It is well
established that no state may attempt to isolate itself from a
problem common to the several states by raising barriers to the
free flow of interstate commerce. Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437
U.S. 617, 628 (1978). However, states that use the least
discriminatory means possible to address legitimate state
concerns that outweigh any apprehension of interruption to the
flow of commerce are not in violation of the Commerce Clause.
Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662 (1981). As such,
assuming that the Court proceeds on the merits of CARE‟s
challenge, ERAA should be found constitutional.
i.

ERAA is not Per Se Unconstitutional.

The Commerce Clause provides that “[t]he Congress shall
have Power . . . [t]o regulate Commerce . . . among the several
States.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. Although “phrased as a grant
of regulatory power to Congress, the Clause has long been
understood to have a „negative‟ aspect that denies the States the
power unjustifiably to discriminate against or burden the
interstate flow of articles of commerce.” Or. Waste Sys. Inc. v.
Dep’t of Environmental Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 98 (1994). With
certain exceptions, the negative, or dormant Commerce Clause
prohibits states from discriminating against the free flow of
interstate commerce. The Commerce Clause applies to the
interstate flow of hazardous waste. Chemical Waste Mgmt. Inc. v.
Hunt, 504 U.S. 334, 340 (1992); see also Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at
621-23 (“All objects of interstate trade merit Commerce Clause
protection; none is excluded by definition at the outset.”).
ERAA is best categorized as a quarantine law that
distinguishes waste by toxicity and not origin. Thus, it cannot be
per se unconstitutional. Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 629; see also
Asbell v. Kansas, 209 U.S. 251 (1908); Reid v. Colorado, 187 U.S.
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137 (1902) (holding constitutional quarantines banning the
importation of articles such as diseased livestock that required
destruction as soon as possible because their very movement
risked contagion).
In Philadelphia v. New Jersey the Court found that a New
Jersey law prohibiting the importation of most “solid or liquid
waste which originated or was collected outside the territorial
limits of the State” to be a violation of the Commerce Clause. 437
U.S. at 629. The Court held that the law violated the principle of
nondiscrimination as it treated out-of-state waste differently than
waste produced within the state. Id. Since New Jersey could not
demonstrate a legitimate reason for distinguishing between
foreign and domestically produced waste, it was clear to the
Court that the state had “overtly moved to slow or freeze the flow
of commerce for protectionist reasons” and struck down the New
Jersey law. Id. at 628.
EPA concedes that provisions of ERAA touch upon matters of
interstate commerce and are subject to analysis under the
dormant Commerce Clause.
As such, if the legislation is
protectionist, it is per se unconstitutional. Philadelphia, 437 U.S.
at 626. In Philadelphia v. New Jersey there was no way to
distinguish the banned out-of-state waste from the waste created
within New Jersey. Id. at 629. Thus, if one is harmful so is the
other and to discriminate solely on origin is protectionist and
unconstitutional.
Id.
This prejudicial and protectionist
distinction of in-state versus out-of-state is not found in the
ERAA. All forms of Pollutant X, whether native or foreign to
New Union, are treated equally under ERAA. Thus, ERAA is
better categorized as a quarantine law, which does not
“discriminate against interstate commerce as such, but simply
prevent[s] traffic in noxious articles, whatever their origin.” Id.
Therefore, ERAA is not per se unconstitutional.
ii.

ERAA Addresses Legitimate State Concerns
Which Outweigh Any Negative Ramifications to
Commerce in the Least Discriminatory Manner
Possible.
1. New Union’s Legitimate State Concerns
Outweigh Possible Impediment to Interstate
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Commerce
When a state law falls within the realm of the Commerce
Clause, the legitimate concerns of the state must be weighed
against effects the legislation has on interstate commerce. Kassel,
450 U.S. at 662 (1981). New Union‟s legitimate concern for the
possible contamination of Pollutant X through the state
outweighs any negative effects that ERAA may have on interstate
commerce. (R. at 3).
In Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corporation, the Court
found that an Iowa statute that prohibited the use of 65-foot
double trailer trucks, but permitted 55-foot single trailer trucks
within the state unconstitutionally burdened interstate
commerce. 450 U.S. at 662. To reach this conclusion, the Court
employed a balancing test that compared the nature of the state‟s
regulatory concern with the extent of the burden to interstate
commerce. Id. at 670. Justice Powell noted that while a state‟s
power to regulate commerce is never greater than in matters of
local concern, such justifications could not be illusory. Id. Since
the Idaho law placed a great burden on interstate commerce and
Iowa had failed to present any persuasive evidence that the 65foot doubles were less safe than 55-foot singles to counterbalance
these concerns of commerce, the Court struck down the law. Id.
at 671
Following the dormant Commerce Clause analysis, since
ERAA is not protectionist, the Court should apply the balancing
test utilized under Kassel. 450 U.S. at 662. Under this test, for
ERAA to be constitutional, the benefits of keeping Pollutant X out
of New Union must outweigh the burden this exclusion places
upon inter-State commerce. Id. In light of New Union‟s
reasonable provisions allowing safe and expedited passage of
Pollutant X through the state, as well as the safety considerations
of surrounding states, it is in the best interest of all that ERAA
remain in effect. Its limited influence on interstate commerce is
outweighed by the serious threat of contamination, recognized by
both the World Health Organization and EPA. (R. at 3).
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2. ERAA is the Least Discriminatory Option
Available to New Union.
Mindful of New Union‟s current inability to process Pollutant
X, ERAA can be warranted as the least discriminatory option
available to deal with handling such a toxic and dangerous
pollutant. Chem. Waste Mgmt., 504 U.S. at 340. A state lacking
certain types of waste disposal facilities is not uncommon and
Congress has recognized that not all states can process all
pollutants. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n v. Ala. Dep’t of Envtl.
Mgmt., 910 F.2d 713, 717 (11th Cir. 1990).
In Chemical Waste Management Inc. v. Hunt, the petitioner
operated a commercial hazardous waste land disposal facility in
Emelle, Alabama, that received both in-state and out-of-state
wastes. 504 U.S. at 337. An Alabama act imposed, inter alia, a
fee on hazardous wastes disposed of at in-state commercial
facilities, and an additional fee on hazardous wastes generated
outside, but disposed of inside, the state. Id. The Court found
that Alabama‟s differential treatment of out-of-state waste
violated the Commerce Clause. Id. at 339. The Court held that
Alabama had not met its burden of showing the unavailability of
nondiscriminatory alternatives adequate to preserve the local
interests at stake and thus found the law in question
unconstitutional. Id. at 341.
The court in Chemical Waste Management held that the state
has a burden of showing the unavailability of nondiscriminatory
alternatives adequate to preserve the local interests at stake, and
that the state must first explore less discriminatory means. 504
U.S. at 340. In the case at hand, New Union can make such a
showing. ERAA is a necessary measure that allows New Union to
handle Pollutant X at a time when New Union is not equipped
with facilities that are capable of handling such a volatile and
toxic substance. It has been recognized by Congress on several
occasions that because of geological factors or for other reasons,
every state may not be able to create disposal facilities within its
borders and will not be able to dispose of its waste within its own
borders. Nat’l Solid Wastes, 910 F.2d at 717. Often a state that
cannot safely dispose of wastes within its borders will reach
agreements with another states (or states) to create mutually
beneficial arrangements to deal with such shortcomings. Id.
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Since New Union is using the least discriminatory means
possible to address legitimate state concerns that outweigh any
apprehension of interruption to the flow of commerce, ERAA
should be found constitutional.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should find that (1)
district courts have jurisdiction to order EPA to act on CARE‟s
petition; (2) 28 U.S.C. § 1331 does not provide jurisdiction to
district courts to order EPA to act on CARE‟s petition; and (3)
EPA‟s failure to act on the petition was not a constructive denial
and constructive determination. If the Court does find there was
a constructive denial and determination, the Court should not lift
the stay on C.A. No. 18-2010, and should instead remand to the
district court to order EPA to act. If the Court proceeds on the
merits, it should find that EPA is not required to withdraw
approval of New Union‟s program because (1) its resources and
performance continue to meet RCRA approval criteria; (2) the
failure to regulate railroad hazardous waste facilities does not
require withdrawal of approval; and (3) ERAA does not affect the
New Union state program‟s equivalency, consistency, or
compliance with the Commerce Clause.
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